A coalition formation value for games in partition function form

Michel Grabisch, Yukihiko Funaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e.; how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)175-185
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume221
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Aug 16

Keywords

  • Coalition formation
  • Game theory
  • Games in partition function form
  • Shapley value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Information Systems and Management

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