A coalition formation value for games in partition function form

Michel Grabisch, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e.; how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)175-185
    Number of pages11
    JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
    Volume221
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012 Aug 16

    Fingerprint

    Coalition Formation
    Partition Function
    Game
    Coalitions
    Scenarios
    Externalities
    Solution Concepts
    Axiomatization
    Partition
    Form
    Coalition formation

    Keywords

    • Coalition formation
    • Game theory
    • Games in partition function form
    • Shapley value

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Management Science and Operations Research
    • Modelling and Simulation
    • Information Systems and Management

    Cite this

    A coalition formation value for games in partition function form. / Grabisch, Michel; Funaki, Yukihiko.

    In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 221, No. 1, 16.08.2012, p. 175-185.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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