A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in federated wireless networks

Bo Gu, Kyoko Yamori, Sugang Xu, Yoshiaki Tanaka

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    8 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a "federated network" concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1109-1116
    Number of pages8
    JournalIEICE Transactions on Communications
    VolumeE95-B
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012 Apr

    Fingerprint

    Frequency allocation
    Wireless local area networks (WLAN)
    Wireless networks
    Costs

    Keywords

    • Auction
    • Equilibrium
    • Game theory
    • Hotspots
    • Mobility
    • Pricing
    • Roaming
    • Ubiquitous
    • Wireless access

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Software

    Cite this

    A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in federated wireless networks. / Gu, Bo; Yamori, Kyoko; Xu, Sugang; Tanaka, Yoshiaki.

    In: IEICE Transactions on Communications, Vol. E95-B, No. 4, 04.2012, p. 1109-1116.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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