A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

Mamoru Kaneko, Jacek Prokop

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game with n lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-24
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie
Volume58
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1993 Feb
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

International debt
Debt overhang
Secondary market
Loans
Nash equilibrium
Functioning
Foreign banks
Market price
Non-cooperative game
Mixed strategy equilibrium
Pure strategies
Comparative statics
Mixed strategy
Debt

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang. / Kaneko, Mamoru; Prokop, Jacek.

In: Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, Vol. 58, No. 1, 02.1993, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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