A global game analysis of the LLR: The role of creditors' behaviour and penalty rate lending

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We construct a global-game LLR model in which the policy maker to provide LLR is an explicit player that cannot distinguish solvent from insolvent banks ex ante.We first show that creditors' aggregate behaviour to withdraw their funds operates as a signal to the policy maker about banks' solvency. Then it is shown that the policy maker optimally helps only illiquid but solvent banks and the lending rates are strictly positive whenever LLR is utilised. The rates can be seen as 'conditionally punitive' in the sense that they take the highest level under the restriction that the solvent borrowers survive.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)398-421
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance
Volume8
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Global games
Penalty
Politicians
Lending
Game analysis
Solvency

Keywords

  • Bagehot Doctrine
  • Global game
  • Lender of last resort
  • LLR
  • Penaltyrate ending

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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