Abstract
This paper examines the characteristics of a profit-sharing reforestation contract from the viewpoint of the efficient use of forest resources. A profit-sharing reforestation contract is defined here as a contract where a planter rents the land for some period for forest management and shares the proceeds from the sale of stumpage with the land-owner in some ratio. The planter is considered to be a public sector in the paper. Under the four assumptions; namely 1) the world is in a deterministic steady state, 2) the stumpage proceeds function is concave and increasing during the rotation periods, 3) the discount rate of the land-owner coincides with that of the planter, and 4) the externality of forests does not exist; it is shown that the rotation periods and the share rates are unique. It also is shown that the rotation period is socially optimal and coincides with one derived from thefaustmannformula.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 185-190 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Nihon Ringakkai Shi/Journal of the Japanese Forestry Society |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - 1993 Sep 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Forestry
Cite this
A micro economic analysis of a profit-sharing reforestation contract (I) A basic model and its results. / Akao, Kenichi.
In: Nihon Ringakkai Shi/Journal of the Japanese Forestry Society, Vol. 75, No. 3, 01.09.1993, p. 185-190.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A micro economic analysis of a profit-sharing reforestation contract (I) A basic model and its results
AU - Akao, Kenichi
PY - 1993/9/1
Y1 - 1993/9/1
N2 - This paper examines the characteristics of a profit-sharing reforestation contract from the viewpoint of the efficient use of forest resources. A profit-sharing reforestation contract is defined here as a contract where a planter rents the land for some period for forest management and shares the proceeds from the sale of stumpage with the land-owner in some ratio. The planter is considered to be a public sector in the paper. Under the four assumptions; namely 1) the world is in a deterministic steady state, 2) the stumpage proceeds function is concave and increasing during the rotation periods, 3) the discount rate of the land-owner coincides with that of the planter, and 4) the externality of forests does not exist; it is shown that the rotation periods and the share rates are unique. It also is shown that the rotation period is socially optimal and coincides with one derived from thefaustmannformula.
AB - This paper examines the characteristics of a profit-sharing reforestation contract from the viewpoint of the efficient use of forest resources. A profit-sharing reforestation contract is defined here as a contract where a planter rents the land for some period for forest management and shares the proceeds from the sale of stumpage with the land-owner in some ratio. The planter is considered to be a public sector in the paper. Under the four assumptions; namely 1) the world is in a deterministic steady state, 2) the stumpage proceeds function is concave and increasing during the rotation periods, 3) the discount rate of the land-owner coincides with that of the planter, and 4) the externality of forests does not exist; it is shown that the rotation periods and the share rates are unique. It also is shown that the rotation period is socially optimal and coincides with one derived from thefaustmannformula.
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M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85024244757
VL - 75
SP - 185
EP - 190
JO - THE JOURNAL of THE JAPANESE FORESTRY SOCIETY
JF - THE JOURNAL of THE JAPANESE FORESTRY SOCIETY
SN - 0021-485X
IS - 3
ER -