A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)76-79
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume155
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jun 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Multi-item auctions
Price controls
Walrasian equilibrium
Ascending auctions
Bidding
Polynomials
Budget constraint

Keywords

  • Budget constraints
  • Core allocation
  • Multi-item auction
  • Price controls
  • Rationed equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls. / Zhou, Yu.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 155, 01.06.2017, p. 76-79.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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