A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)508-518
    Number of pages11
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume87
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

    Fingerprint

    Ranking
    Common knowledge
    Backward induction
    Subgame perfect equilibrium
    Juries

    Keywords

    • Backward induction
    • Implementation theory
    • Subgame perfect equilibrium

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites. / Adachi, Tsuyoshi.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 87, 01.01.2014, p. 508-518.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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