A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

Tsuyoshi Adachi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)508-518
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Sep


  • Backward induction
  • Implementation theory
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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