A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)508-518
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume87
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Sep

Keywords

  • Backward induction
  • Implementation theory
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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