Abstract
We study one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. In this context, when a preference domain is unrestricted, it is known that no stable rule is strategy-proof. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition, and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. In addition, we show that when the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the no-detour condition is also a necessary condition for the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. As a result, under the assumption that the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) a preference domain satisfies the no-detour condition, (ii) there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule, (iii) there is a stable and strategy-proof rule.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 683-702 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Cite this
A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof. / Akahoshi, Takashi.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2014, p. 683-702.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
AU - Akahoshi, Takashi
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - We study one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. In this context, when a preference domain is unrestricted, it is known that no stable rule is strategy-proof. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition, and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. In addition, we show that when the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the no-detour condition is also a necessary condition for the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. As a result, under the assumption that the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) a preference domain satisfies the no-detour condition, (ii) there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule, (iii) there is a stable and strategy-proof rule.
AB - We study one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. In this context, when a preference domain is unrestricted, it is known that no stable rule is strategy-proof. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition, and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. In addition, we show that when the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the no-detour condition is also a necessary condition for the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. As a result, under the assumption that the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) a preference domain satisfies the no-detour condition, (ii) there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule, (iii) there is a stable and strategy-proof rule.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84924404951&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84924404951&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-014-0803-1
DO - 10.1007/s00355-014-0803-1
M3 - Article
VL - 43
SP - 683
EP - 702
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 3
ER -