A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof

Takashi Akahoshi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We study one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. In this context, when a preference domain is unrestricted, it is known that no stable rule is strategy-proof. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition, and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. In addition, we show that when the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the no-detour condition is also a necessary condition for the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. As a result, under the assumption that the men’s preference domain is unrestricted, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) a preference domain satisfies the no-detour condition, (ii) there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule, (iii) there is a stable and strategy-proof rule.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)683-702
    Number of pages20
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Volume43
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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