A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model

Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that it is possible to track the changes in the distribution of power within a couple by focusing on the changes in the pattern of private consumption when the consumption decisions are efficient and private consumption is separable from public consumption in individual preferences. We first show that the separability of private consumption from public consumption at the individual level carries over to the household level. Hence, changes in public consumption only matters through a change in the residual budget available for private consumption. When the consumption decisions within the household is efficient, private consumption decisions can be modeled as the solution of a problem consisting in maximizing a weighted sum of the private-consumption sub-utility functions of the spouses under the residual budget, the weights being unique and representing the distribution of power over the allocation of private consumption. The model presented in this paper can be used to analyze the changes in the household resource allocation due to, for example, childbirth.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-149
Number of pages7
JournalReview of Economics of the Household
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

resources
distribution of power
Collective household models
Intrahousehold resource allocation
Private consumption
Separability
budget
spouse
Public consumption
Household

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Collective model
  • Intra-household resource allocation
  • Separability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

A note on separability and intra-household resource allocation in a collective household model. / Fujii, Tomoki; Ishikawa, Ryuichiro.

In: Review of Economics of the Household, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2013, p. 143-149.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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