A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider

Cheng Zhang, Bo Gu, Kyoko Yamori, Sugang Xu, Yoshiaki Tanaka

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    With the popularity of smart devices such as smartphones, tablets, contents that traditionally be viewed on a personal computer, can also be viewed on these smart devices. The demand for contents thus is increasing year by year, which makes the content providers (CPs) get high revenue from either users' subscription or advertisement. On the other hand, Internet service providers (ISPs), who keep investing in the network technology or capacity to support the huge traffic generated by contents, do not benefit directly from the content traffic. One choice for ISPs is to charge CPs to share the revenue from the huge content traffic. Then ISPs will have enough incentives to invest in network infrastructure to improve quality of services (QoS), which eventually benefit CPs and users. This paper presents a novel economic model called Stackelberg-Bertrand game to capture the interaction and competitions among ISPs, CPs and users when ISPs charge CPs. A generic user demand function is assumed to capture the sensitivity of demand to prices of ISPs and CPs. The numerical results show that the price elasticity of ISP and CP plays an important part on the payoff of the ISP and CP.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationMOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications
    PublisherICST
    ISBN (Electronic)9781631900662
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Aug 3
    Event8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications, MOBIMEDIA 2015 - Chengdu, China
    Duration: 2015 May 252015 May 27

    Other

    Other8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications, MOBIMEDIA 2015
    CountryChina
    CityChengdu
    Period15/5/2515/5/27

    Fingerprint

    Internet service providers
    Costs
    Smartphones
    Personal computers
    Elasticity
    Quality of service
    Economics

    Keywords

    • Content provider
    • Internet service provider
    • Network neutrality
    • Stackelberg-Bertrand game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
    • Computer Networks and Communications

    Cite this

    Zhang, C., Gu, B., Yamori, K., Xu, S., & Tanaka, Y. (2015). A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider. In MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications ICST. https://doi.org/10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259082

    A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider. / Zhang, Cheng; Gu, Bo; Yamori, Kyoko; Xu, Sugang; Tanaka, Yoshiaki.

    MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications. ICST, 2015.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Zhang, C, Gu, B, Yamori, K, Xu, S & Tanaka, Y 2015, A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider. in MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications. ICST, 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications, MOBIMEDIA 2015, Chengdu, China, 15/5/25. https://doi.org/10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259082
    Zhang C, Gu B, Yamori K, Xu S, Tanaka Y. A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider. In MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications. ICST. 2015 https://doi.org/10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259082
    Zhang, Cheng ; Gu, Bo ; Yamori, Kyoko ; Xu, Sugang ; Tanaka, Yoshiaki. / A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider. MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications. ICST, 2015.
    @inproceedings{a82b8981755045a1a9f5af4c453f501b,
    title = "A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider",
    abstract = "With the popularity of smart devices such as smartphones, tablets, contents that traditionally be viewed on a personal computer, can also be viewed on these smart devices. The demand for contents thus is increasing year by year, which makes the content providers (CPs) get high revenue from either users' subscription or advertisement. On the other hand, Internet service providers (ISPs), who keep investing in the network technology or capacity to support the huge traffic generated by contents, do not benefit directly from the content traffic. One choice for ISPs is to charge CPs to share the revenue from the huge content traffic. Then ISPs will have enough incentives to invest in network infrastructure to improve quality of services (QoS), which eventually benefit CPs and users. This paper presents a novel economic model called Stackelberg-Bertrand game to capture the interaction and competitions among ISPs, CPs and users when ISPs charge CPs. A generic user demand function is assumed to capture the sensitivity of demand to prices of ISPs and CPs. The numerical results show that the price elasticity of ISP and CP plays an important part on the payoff of the ISP and CP.",
    keywords = "Content provider, Internet service provider, Network neutrality, Stackelberg-Bertrand game",
    author = "Cheng Zhang and Bo Gu and Kyoko Yamori and Sugang Xu and Yoshiaki Tanaka",
    year = "2015",
    month = "8",
    day = "3",
    doi = "10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259082",
    language = "English",
    booktitle = "MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications",
    publisher = "ICST",

    }

    TY - GEN

    T1 - A novel stackelberg-bertrand game model for pricing content provider

    AU - Zhang, Cheng

    AU - Gu, Bo

    AU - Yamori, Kyoko

    AU - Xu, Sugang

    AU - Tanaka, Yoshiaki

    PY - 2015/8/3

    Y1 - 2015/8/3

    N2 - With the popularity of smart devices such as smartphones, tablets, contents that traditionally be viewed on a personal computer, can also be viewed on these smart devices. The demand for contents thus is increasing year by year, which makes the content providers (CPs) get high revenue from either users' subscription or advertisement. On the other hand, Internet service providers (ISPs), who keep investing in the network technology or capacity to support the huge traffic generated by contents, do not benefit directly from the content traffic. One choice for ISPs is to charge CPs to share the revenue from the huge content traffic. Then ISPs will have enough incentives to invest in network infrastructure to improve quality of services (QoS), which eventually benefit CPs and users. This paper presents a novel economic model called Stackelberg-Bertrand game to capture the interaction and competitions among ISPs, CPs and users when ISPs charge CPs. A generic user demand function is assumed to capture the sensitivity of demand to prices of ISPs and CPs. The numerical results show that the price elasticity of ISP and CP plays an important part on the payoff of the ISP and CP.

    AB - With the popularity of smart devices such as smartphones, tablets, contents that traditionally be viewed on a personal computer, can also be viewed on these smart devices. The demand for contents thus is increasing year by year, which makes the content providers (CPs) get high revenue from either users' subscription or advertisement. On the other hand, Internet service providers (ISPs), who keep investing in the network technology or capacity to support the huge traffic generated by contents, do not benefit directly from the content traffic. One choice for ISPs is to charge CPs to share the revenue from the huge content traffic. Then ISPs will have enough incentives to invest in network infrastructure to improve quality of services (QoS), which eventually benefit CPs and users. This paper presents a novel economic model called Stackelberg-Bertrand game to capture the interaction and competitions among ISPs, CPs and users when ISPs charge CPs. A generic user demand function is assumed to capture the sensitivity of demand to prices of ISPs and CPs. The numerical results show that the price elasticity of ISP and CP plays an important part on the payoff of the ISP and CP.

    KW - Content provider

    KW - Internet service provider

    KW - Network neutrality

    KW - Stackelberg-Bertrand game

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85027404597&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85027404597&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259082

    DO - 10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259082

    M3 - Conference contribution

    BT - MOBIMEDIA 2015 - 8th International Conference on Mobile Multimedia Communications

    PB - ICST

    ER -