A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A scan-based side-channel attack is still a real threat against a crypto circuit as well as a hash generator circuit, which can restore secret information by exploiting the scan data obtained from scan chains inside the chip during its processing. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method against a hash generator circuit called HMAC-SHA-256. Our proposed method restores the secret information by finding out the correspondence between the scan data obtained from a scan chain and the internal registers in the target HMAC-SHA-256 circuit, even if the scan chain includes registers other than the target hash generator circuit and an attacker does not know well the hash generation timing. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully restores two secret keys of the HMAC-SHA-256 circuit in at most 6 hours.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017
    PublisherIEEE Computer Society
    Pages79-84
    Number of pages6
    Volume2017-September
    ISBN (Electronic)9781509040148
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 Dec 14
    Event7th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017 - Berlin, Germany
    Duration: 2017 Sep 32017 Sep 6

    Other

    Other7th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017
    CountryGermany
    CityBerlin
    Period17/9/317/9/6

    Fingerprint

    Networks (circuits)
    Side channel attack
    Processing

    Keywords

    • HMAC
    • scan-based attack
    • SHA-256
    • side-channel attack

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Media Technology

    Cite this

    Oku, D., Yanagisawa, M., & Togawa, N. (2017). A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. In 2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017 (Vol. 2017-September, pp. 79-84). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596

    A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. / Oku, Daisuke; Yanagisawa, Masao; Togawa, Nozomu.

    2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017. Vol. 2017-September IEEE Computer Society, 2017. p. 79-84.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Oku, D, Yanagisawa, M & Togawa, N 2017, A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. in 2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017. vol. 2017-September, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 79-84, 7th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017, Berlin, Germany, 17/9/3. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596
    Oku D, Yanagisawa M, Togawa N. A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. In 2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017. Vol. 2017-September. IEEE Computer Society. 2017. p. 79-84 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596
    Oku, Daisuke ; Yanagisawa, Masao ; Togawa, Nozomu. / A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. 2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017. Vol. 2017-September IEEE Computer Society, 2017. pp. 79-84
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