A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits

Daisuke Oku; Masao Yanagisawa; Nozomu Togawa

doi:10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596

A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits

Daisuke Oku, Masao Yanagisawa, Nozomu Togawa

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A scan-based side-channel attack is still a real threat against a crypto circuit as well as a hash generator circuit, which can restore secret information by exploiting the scan data obtained from scan chains inside the chip during its processing. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method against a hash generator circuit called HMAC-SHA-256. Our proposed method restores the secret information by finding out the correspondence between the scan data obtained from a scan chain and the internal registers in the target HMAC-SHA-256 circuit, even if the scan chain includes registers other than the target hash generator circuit and an attacker does not know well the hash generation timing. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully restores two secret keys of the HMAC-SHA-256 circuit in at most 6 hours.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	79-84
Number of pages	6
Volume	2017-September
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509040148
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596
Publication status	Published - 2017 Dec 14
Event	7th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017 - Berlin, Germany Duration: 2017 Sep 3 → 2017 Sep 6

Other

Other	7th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017
Country	Germany
City	Berlin
Period	17/9/3 → 17/9/6

Keywords

HMAC
scan-based attack
SHA-256
side-channel attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Media Technology

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Cite this

Oku, D., Yanagisawa, M., & Togawa, N. (2017). A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. In 2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017 (Vol. 2017-September, pp. 79-84). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596

Oku, D, Yanagisawa, M & Togawa, N 2017, A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits. in 2017 IEEE 7th International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017. vol. 2017-September, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 79-84, 7th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin, ICCE-Berlin 2017, Berlin, Germany, 17/9/3. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCE-Berlin.2017.8210596

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title = "A robust scan-based side-channel attack method against HMAC-SHA-256 circuits",

abstract = "A scan-based side-channel attack is still a real threat against a crypto circuit as well as a hash generator circuit, which can restore secret information by exploiting the scan data obtained from scan chains inside the chip during its processing. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method against a hash generator circuit called HMAC-SHA-256. Our proposed method restores the secret information by finding out the correspondence between the scan data obtained from a scan chain and the internal registers in the target HMAC-SHA-256 circuit, even if the scan chain includes registers other than the target hash generator circuit and an attacker does not know well the hash generation timing. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully restores two secret keys of the HMAC-SHA-256 circuit in at most 6 hours.",

keywords = "HMAC, scan-based attack, SHA-256, side-channel attack",

author = "Daisuke Oku and Masao Yanagisawa and Nozomu Togawa",

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N2 - A scan-based side-channel attack is still a real threat against a crypto circuit as well as a hash generator circuit, which can restore secret information by exploiting the scan data obtained from scan chains inside the chip during its processing. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method against a hash generator circuit called HMAC-SHA-256. Our proposed method restores the secret information by finding out the correspondence between the scan data obtained from a scan chain and the internal registers in the target HMAC-SHA-256 circuit, even if the scan chain includes registers other than the target hash generator circuit and an attacker does not know well the hash generation timing. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully restores two secret keys of the HMAC-SHA-256 circuit in at most 6 hours.

AB - A scan-based side-channel attack is still a real threat against a crypto circuit as well as a hash generator circuit, which can restore secret information by exploiting the scan data obtained from scan chains inside the chip during its processing. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method against a hash generator circuit called HMAC-SHA-256. Our proposed method restores the secret information by finding out the correspondence between the scan data obtained from a scan chain and the internal registers in the target HMAC-SHA-256 circuit, even if the scan chain includes registers other than the target hash generator circuit and an attacker does not know well the hash generation timing. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully restores two secret keys of the HMAC-SHA-256 circuit in at most 6 hours.

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