A stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers

Cheng Zhang, Bo Gu, Zhi Liu, Kyoko Yamori, Yoshiaki Tanaka

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The past few years have witnessed a huge acceleration in global Internet traffic. Users' demand for contents is also rising accordingly. Therefore, content providers (CPs) that provide contents for users get high revenue from the traffic growth. There are generally two ways for CPs to get revenue: (i) charge users for the contents they view or download; (ii) get revenue from advertisers. On the other hand, Internet service providers (ISPs) are investing in network infrastructure to provide better quality of service (QoS), but they do not benefit directly from the content traffic. One option for ISPs to compensate their investment cost is sharing CPs' revenue by side payment from CPs to ISPs. Then ISPs will be motivated to keep on investing in developing new network technology and enlarging the capacity to improve QoS. However, it is important to evaluate how each player is affected by this kind of side payment. Our previous work has studied this problem by assuming that CPs charged users for the contents they view or download, in this paper it is considered that CP does not directly charge end users, but charges advertisers for revenue. Stackelberg game is utilized to study the interactions among ISP, CP, end users and advertisers. A unique Nash equilibrium is established and numerical analysis has validated our theoretic results. It shows that side payment from CP to ISP impairs the CP's investment of contents, and ISP can benefit from charging CP, while CP's payoff is impaired.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages231-235
    Number of pages5
    ISBN (Electronic)9781509061969
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jul 17
    Event14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017 - Las Vegas, United States
    Duration: 2017 Jan 82017 Jan 11

    Other

    Other14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
    CountryUnited States
    CityLas Vegas
    Period17/1/817/1/11

    Fingerprint

    Internet service providers
    service provider
    Internet
    interaction
    revenue
    Quality of service
    Numerical analysis
    traffic
    cost sharing

    Keywords

    • Advertiser
    • Content provider
    • Internet service provider
    • Pricing
    • Stackelberg game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Hardware and Architecture
    • Communication

    Cite this

    Zhang, C., Gu, B., Liu, Z., Yamori, K., & Tanaka, Y. (2017). A stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers. In 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017 (pp. 231-235). [7983110] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983110

    A stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers. / Zhang, Cheng; Gu, Bo; Liu, Zhi; Yamori, Kyoko; Tanaka, Yoshiaki.

    2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 231-235 7983110.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Zhang, C, Gu, B, Liu, Z, Yamori, K & Tanaka, Y 2017, A stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers. in 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017., 7983110, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 231-235, 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017, Las Vegas, United States, 17/1/8. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983110
    Zhang C, Gu B, Liu Z, Yamori K, Tanaka Y. A stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers. In 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 231-235. 7983110 https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983110
    Zhang, Cheng ; Gu, Bo ; Liu, Zhi ; Yamori, Kyoko ; Tanaka, Yoshiaki. / A stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers. 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. pp. 231-235
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