A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

Yoshihiro Ohashi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper establishes sufficient conditions for two-person ex post implementation of a social choice set in a general environment. A single social choice function is ex post implementable if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity no veto (EMNV) conditions. A general social choice set is ex post implementable if it satisfies another condition, intersection property (IP), in addition to the above.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)63-68
    Number of pages6
    JournalMathematical Social Sciences
    Volume69
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    Fingerprint

    Social Choice
    Motivation
    Person
    incentive
    human being
    Sufficient Conditions
    Incentive Compatibility
    Choice Function
    Monotonicity
    Intersection
    Choice sets
    Social choice
    Veto
    Social choice function
    Incentive compatibility

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Psychology(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment. / Ohashi, Yoshihiro.

    In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 69, No. 1, 2014, p. 63-68.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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