AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model

Hongying Liu, Guoyu Qian, Satoshi Goto, Yukiyasu Tsunoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

As one of the effective side-channel attacks that threaten the security of cryptographic devices, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks exploit the linear relation between the known power consumption and the predicted power consumption of cryptographic devices to recover keys. A robust cryptographic algorithm should endure both the cryptanalysis from software and hardware implementations. Researches have focused on the security examination of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). In this paper, we present the CPA attack with the Switching Distance model against an AES implementation on ASIC. Compared with the leakage model of Hamming Distance, the power traces of recovering keys have been decreased by as much as 25%. These should cause more attention of security experts.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010
Pages218-222
Number of pages5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Event3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010 - Guangzhou
Duration: 2010 Jul 292010 Jul 31

Other

Other3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010
CityGuangzhou
Period10/7/2910/7/31

Fingerprint

Cryptography
Recovery
Electric power utilization
Hamming distance
Application specific integrated circuits
Hardware
Side channel attack
Encryption
Attack

Keywords

  • AES
  • CPA
  • Hamming Distance
  • Side-channel attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Marketing

Cite this

Liu, H., Qian, G., Goto, S., & Tsunoo, Y. (2010). AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model. In 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010 (pp. 218-222). [5557399] https://doi.org/10.1109/ISECS.2010.55

AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model. / Liu, Hongying; Qian, Guoyu; Goto, Satoshi; Tsunoo, Yukiyasu.

3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010. 2010. p. 218-222 5557399.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Liu, H, Qian, G, Goto, S & Tsunoo, Y 2010, AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model. in 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010., 5557399, pp. 218-222, 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010, Guangzhou, 10/7/29. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISECS.2010.55
Liu H, Qian G, Goto S, Tsunoo Y. AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model. In 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010. 2010. p. 218-222. 5557399 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISECS.2010.55
Liu, Hongying ; Qian, Guoyu ; Goto, Satoshi ; Tsunoo, Yukiyasu. / AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model. 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010. 2010. pp. 218-222
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