Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note

Dan Qin

    Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

    Abstract

    To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)976-983
    Number of pages8
    JournalEconomics Bulletin
    Volume34
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    Fingerprint

    Collective decision-making
    Rationality
    Pareto

    Keywords

    • Preference aggregation
    • Quasi-transitivity
    • Veto power
    • Weak pareto extension rule

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences : A note. / Qin, Dan.

    In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2014, p. 976-983.

    Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

    Qin, D 2014, 'Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note', Economics Bulletin, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 976-983.
    Qin D. Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note. Economics Bulletin. 2014;34(2):976-983.
    Qin, Dan. / Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences : A note. In: Economics Bulletin. 2014 ; Vol. 34, No. 2. pp. 976-983.
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