Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note

Dan Qin*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)976-983
    Number of pages8
    JournalEconomics Bulletin
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - 2014


    • Preference aggregation
    • Quasi-transitivity
    • Veto power
    • Weak pareto extension rule

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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