Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note

Dan Qin

Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note

Dan Qin^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	976-983
Number of pages	8
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	34
Issue number	2
Publication status	Published - 2014

Keywords

Preference aggregation
Quasi-transitivity
Veto power
Weak pareto extension rule

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

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title = "Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note",

abstract = "To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.",

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year = "2014",

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journal = "Economics Bulletin",

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Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: A note

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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