Abstract
To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 976-983 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Economics Bulletin |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Keywords
- Preference aggregation
- Quasi-transitivity
- Veto power
- Weak pareto extension rule
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)