An analysis of an incentive problem considering non-monetary utility

Ryohei Matsumura, Kyoichi Kijima, Bumpei Nakano, Shingo Takahashi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The present paper describes a new approach to the agency model, which is a cybernetic model designed to analyze the situation in which an economic actor (the principal) controls the behavior of another actor (the agent), by including the factor of non-monetary utility (intrinsic motivation). The new model addresses an incentive problem in an organization. An organization is considered to be a system constituted by the principal and the agent. Two state variables of this system, namely productivity and intrinsic motivation, are the focus of the present study. The effect of these variables on how to offer incentive is analyzed. The following results were obtained: when productivity is high and the strength of intrinsic motivation and uncertainty of output are low, organizations should introduce performance-based incentive system.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)511-522
    Number of pages12
    JournalKybernetes
    Volume32
    Issue number3-4
    Publication statusPublished - 2003

    Fingerprint

    intrinsic motivation
    Incentives
    incentive
    Productivity
    productivity
    incentive system
    organization
    Cybernetics
    cybernetics
    uncertainty
    Model
    Economics
    Uncertainty
    Output
    performance
    economics
    Actors

    Keywords

    • Cybernetics
    • Motivation
    • Productivity

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Human-Computer Interaction
    • Control and Systems Engineering

    Cite this

    Matsumura, R., Kijima, K., Nakano, B., & Takahashi, S. (2003). An analysis of an incentive problem considering non-monetary utility. Kybernetes, 32(3-4), 511-522.

    An analysis of an incentive problem considering non-monetary utility. / Matsumura, Ryohei; Kijima, Kyoichi; Nakano, Bumpei; Takahashi, Shingo.

    In: Kybernetes, Vol. 32, No. 3-4, 2003, p. 511-522.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Matsumura, R, Kijima, K, Nakano, B & Takahashi, S 2003, 'An analysis of an incentive problem considering non-monetary utility', Kybernetes, vol. 32, no. 3-4, pp. 511-522.
    Matsumura, Ryohei ; Kijima, Kyoichi ; Nakano, Bumpei ; Takahashi, Shingo. / An analysis of an incentive problem considering non-monetary utility. In: Kybernetes. 2003 ; Vol. 32, No. 3-4. pp. 511-522.
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