An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems

Eduardo B. Fernandez, Hironori Washizaki, Nobukazu Yoshioka, Michael VanHilst

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A good way to obtain secure systems is to build applications in a systematic way where security is an integral part of the lifecycle. The same applies to reliability. If we want a system which is secure and reliable, both security and reliability must be built together. If we build not only applications but also middleware and operating systems in the same way, we can build systems that not only are inherently secure but also can withstand attacks from malicious applications and resist errors. In addition, all security and reliability constraints should be defined in the application level, where their semantics is understood and propagated to the lower levels. The lower levels provide the assurance that the constraints are being followed. In this approach all security constraints are defined at the conceptual or application level. The lower levels just enforce that there are no ways to bypass these constraints. By mapping to a highly secure platform, e.g., one using capabilities, we can produce a very secure system. Our approach is based on security patterns that are mapped through the architectural levels of the system. We make a case for this approach and we present here three aspects to further develop it. These aspects include a metamodel for security requirements, a mapping of models across architectural levels, and considerations about the degree of security of the system.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011
    Pages260-265
    Number of pages6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011
    Event2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011 - Vienna
    Duration: 2011 Aug 222011 Aug 26

    Other

    Other2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011
    CityVienna
    Period11/8/2211/8/26

    Fingerprint

    Computer operating systems
    Middleware
    Semantics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

    Cite this

    Fernandez, E. B., Washizaki, H., Yoshioka, N., & VanHilst, M. (2011). An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems. In Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011 (pp. 260-265). [6045948] https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2011.45

    An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems. / Fernandez, Eduardo B.; Washizaki, Hironori; Yoshioka, Nobukazu; VanHilst, Michael.

    Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011. 2011. p. 260-265 6045948.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Fernandez, EB, Washizaki, H, Yoshioka, N & VanHilst, M 2011, An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems. in Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011., 6045948, pp. 260-265, 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011, Vienna, 11/8/22. https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2011.45
    Fernandez EB, Washizaki H, Yoshioka N, VanHilst M. An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems. In Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011. 2011. p. 260-265. 6045948 https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2011.45
    Fernandez, Eduardo B. ; Washizaki, Hironori ; Yoshioka, Nobukazu ; VanHilst, Michael. / An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems. Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011. 2011. pp. 260-265
    @inproceedings{7040127c7c6b41fea179dd60a61c6caa,
    title = "An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems",
    abstract = "A good way to obtain secure systems is to build applications in a systematic way where security is an integral part of the lifecycle. The same applies to reliability. If we want a system which is secure and reliable, both security and reliability must be built together. If we build not only applications but also middleware and operating systems in the same way, we can build systems that not only are inherently secure but also can withstand attacks from malicious applications and resist errors. In addition, all security and reliability constraints should be defined in the application level, where their semantics is understood and propagated to the lower levels. The lower levels provide the assurance that the constraints are being followed. In this approach all security constraints are defined at the conceptual or application level. The lower levels just enforce that there are no ways to bypass these constraints. By mapping to a highly secure platform, e.g., one using capabilities, we can produce a very secure system. Our approach is based on security patterns that are mapped through the architectural levels of the system. We make a case for this approach and we present here three aspects to further develop it. These aspects include a metamodel for security requirements, a mapping of models across architectural levels, and considerations about the degree of security of the system.",
    author = "Fernandez, {Eduardo B.} and Hironori Washizaki and Nobukazu Yoshioka and Michael VanHilst",
    year = "2011",
    doi = "10.1109/ARES.2011.45",
    language = "English",
    isbn = "9780769544854",
    pages = "260--265",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011",

    }

    TY - GEN

    T1 - An approach to model-based development of secure and reliable systems

    AU - Fernandez, Eduardo B.

    AU - Washizaki, Hironori

    AU - Yoshioka, Nobukazu

    AU - VanHilst, Michael

    PY - 2011

    Y1 - 2011

    N2 - A good way to obtain secure systems is to build applications in a systematic way where security is an integral part of the lifecycle. The same applies to reliability. If we want a system which is secure and reliable, both security and reliability must be built together. If we build not only applications but also middleware and operating systems in the same way, we can build systems that not only are inherently secure but also can withstand attacks from malicious applications and resist errors. In addition, all security and reliability constraints should be defined in the application level, where their semantics is understood and propagated to the lower levels. The lower levels provide the assurance that the constraints are being followed. In this approach all security constraints are defined at the conceptual or application level. The lower levels just enforce that there are no ways to bypass these constraints. By mapping to a highly secure platform, e.g., one using capabilities, we can produce a very secure system. Our approach is based on security patterns that are mapped through the architectural levels of the system. We make a case for this approach and we present here three aspects to further develop it. These aspects include a metamodel for security requirements, a mapping of models across architectural levels, and considerations about the degree of security of the system.

    AB - A good way to obtain secure systems is to build applications in a systematic way where security is an integral part of the lifecycle. The same applies to reliability. If we want a system which is secure and reliable, both security and reliability must be built together. If we build not only applications but also middleware and operating systems in the same way, we can build systems that not only are inherently secure but also can withstand attacks from malicious applications and resist errors. In addition, all security and reliability constraints should be defined in the application level, where their semantics is understood and propagated to the lower levels. The lower levels provide the assurance that the constraints are being followed. In this approach all security constraints are defined at the conceptual or application level. The lower levels just enforce that there are no ways to bypass these constraints. By mapping to a highly secure platform, e.g., one using capabilities, we can produce a very secure system. Our approach is based on security patterns that are mapped through the architectural levels of the system. We make a case for this approach and we present here three aspects to further develop it. These aspects include a metamodel for security requirements, a mapping of models across architectural levels, and considerations about the degree of security of the system.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80455140427&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=80455140427&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1109/ARES.2011.45

    DO - 10.1109/ARES.2011.45

    M3 - Conference contribution

    SN - 9780769544854

    SP - 260

    EP - 265

    BT - Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011

    ER -