TY - GEN
T1 - An auction protocol which hides bids of losers
AU - Sako, Kazue
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - Many auction protocols using practical cryptographic means have successfully achieved capability of hiding the bids of each entity, but not the values of bids themselves. In this paper we describe an auction protocol which hides the bids of non-winners even from the bid-opening centers, and still makes it possible to publicly verify the validity of the winning bid, i.e. that it was the highest bid submitted. The first approach to such a protocol was made by Kikuchi et al in [KHT98]. However, several deficiencies have been pointed out regarding their protocol; for example, it is not well suited for handling tie bids. We present an auction protocol in which a bid will not be successfully decrypted unless it is the highest bid, thus ensuring bid privacy. In addition, it enables participants to verify that the winning bid is indeed the highest. Also in contrast to the previous work, our protocol can identify all the winners who submitted the winning bid. Our protocol allows for very compact representations for bids: a bid is represented by a single probabilistic encryption. In the protocol of [KHT98] a bid is represented by a vector of encryptions, of length linear in the number of possible bid values. We present two practical schemes based on the ElGamal cryptosystem and the RSA cryptosystems, respectively.
AB - Many auction protocols using practical cryptographic means have successfully achieved capability of hiding the bids of each entity, but not the values of bids themselves. In this paper we describe an auction protocol which hides the bids of non-winners even from the bid-opening centers, and still makes it possible to publicly verify the validity of the winning bid, i.e. that it was the highest bid submitted. The first approach to such a protocol was made by Kikuchi et al in [KHT98]. However, several deficiencies have been pointed out regarding their protocol; for example, it is not well suited for handling tie bids. We present an auction protocol in which a bid will not be successfully decrypted unless it is the highest bid, thus ensuring bid privacy. In addition, it enables participants to verify that the winning bid is indeed the highest. Also in contrast to the previous work, our protocol can identify all the winners who submitted the winning bid. Our protocol allows for very compact representations for bids: a bid is represented by a single probabilistic encryption. In the protocol of [KHT98] a bid is represented by a vector of encryptions, of length linear in the number of possible bid values. We present two practical schemes based on the ElGamal cryptosystem and the RSA cryptosystems, respectively.
KW - Auction
KW - Group decryption
KW - Privacy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=35248870807&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=35248870807&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-46588-1_28
DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-46588-1_28
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:35248870807
SN - 3540669671
SN - 9783540669678
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 422
EP - 432
BT - Public Key Cryptography - 3rd International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2000, Proceedings
A2 - Imai, Hideki
A2 - Zheng, Yuliang
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 3rd International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2000
Y2 - 18 January 2000 through 20 January 2000
ER -