Abstract
This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 135-148 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1980 Jun |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function. / Kaneko, Mamoru.
In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 12, No. 2, 06.1980, p. 135-148.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function
AU - Kaneko, Mamoru
PY - 1980/6
Y1 - 1980/6
N2 - This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.
AB - This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0001974736&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/BF00154358
DO - 10.1007/BF00154358
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0001974736
VL - 12
SP - 135
EP - 148
JO - Theory and Decision
JF - Theory and Decision
SN - 0040-5833
IS - 2
ER -