Abstract
This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 135-148 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1980 Jun |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
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Cite this
Kaneko, M. (1980). An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function. Theory and Decision, 12(2), 135-148. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154358