Are supply and plant inspections complements or substitutes? A strategic and operational assessment of inspection practices in biotechnology

Kyle J. Mayer, Jack A. Nickerson, Hideo Owan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper theoretically and empirically examines the conventional wisdom in procurement management that often portrays supply inspections and supplier plant inspections as substitutes. We develop a theoretical model that focuses on potential internal spillover costs of the buyer receiving low-quality inputs and external spillover costs should low-quality inputs go undetected. Key to our analysis is the condition of whether a buyer can commit to the intensity of supply inspection. If a buyer cannot commit, supply inspections and plant inspections are substitutes, as widely believed. The two types of inspections, however, may become complements when a buyer is able to commit to the intensity of supply inspection. Complementarity is especially likely when (a) external spillovers are smaller than expected internal spillovers, which depends on the level of buffer inventory, (b) when knowledge sharing between buyer and supplier becomes more effective as the supplier allocates more resources to learning for quality improvement, or (c) when hiding aspects of the production processes is easier for suppliers. We empirically evaluate our model with a new data set drawn from a large biotechnology manufacturer. Empirical results provide broad support for theory, which, we argue, might help to explain variation in inspection practices across industries. Our theory and empirical analysis contribute to the literatures on strategic management, organizational economics, and procurement management by highlighting the organizational and strategic use of inspection practices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1064-1081
Number of pages18
JournalManagement Science
Volume50
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Substitute
Biotechnology
Inspection
Buyers
Spillover
Suppliers
Costs
Procurement
Buffer
Organizational economics
Production process
Knowledge sharing
Quality improvement
Industry
Resources
Strategic management
Wisdom
Empirical analysis
Complementarity
Empirical results

Keywords

  • Biotechnology
  • Complementarity
  • Inspection
  • Moral hazard
  • Quality
  • Spillovers
  • Supply chain

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Are supply and plant inspections complements or substitutes? A strategic and operational assessment of inspection practices in biotechnology. / Mayer, Kyle J.; Nickerson, Jack A.; Owan, Hideo.

In: Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 8, 01.01.2004, p. 1064-1081.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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