Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control

T. Reeves, H. Ohtsuki, Shin Fukui

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Cooperation in a public goods game has been studied extensively to find the conditions for sustaining the commons, yet the effect of asymmetry between agents has been explored very little. Here we study a game theoretic model of cooperation for pest control among farmers. In our simple model, each farmer has a paddy of the same size arranged adjacently on a line. A pest outbreak occurs at an abandoned paddy at one end of the line, directly threatening the frontier farmer adjacent to it. Each farmer pays a cost of his or her choice to an agricultural collective, and the total sum held by the collective is used for pest control, with success probability increasing with the sum. Because the farmers’ incentives depend on their distance from the pest outbreak, our model is an asymmetric public goods game. We derive each farmer's cost strategy at the Nash equilibrium. We find that asymmetry among farmers leads to a few unexpected outcomes. The individual costs at the equilibrium do not necessarily increase with how much the future is valued but rather show threshold behavior. Moreover, an increase in the number of farmers can sometimes paradoxically undermine pest prevention. A comparison with a symmetric public goods game model reveals that the farmer at the greatest risk pays a disproportionate amount of cost in the asymmetric game, making the use of agricultural lands less sustainable.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)238-247
    Number of pages10
    JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
    Volume435
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 Dec 21

    Fingerprint

    Pest control
    Pest Control
    pest control
    Game
    farmers
    Costs
    Asymmetry
    Costs and Cost Analysis
    pests
    Line
    paddies
    Incentives
    Disease Outbreaks
    Nash Equilibrium
    Model
    Adjacent
    Farmers
    Motivation
    agricultural land
    Theoretical Models

    Keywords

    • Asymmetry
    • Cooperation
    • Nash equilibrium
    • Public goods

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics and Probability
    • Modelling and Simulation
    • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
    • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
    • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control. / Reeves, T.; Ohtsuki, H.; Fukui, Shin.

    In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 435, 21.12.2017, p. 238-247.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Reeves, T. ; Ohtsuki, H. ; Fukui, Shin. / Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control. In: Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2017 ; Vol. 435. pp. 238-247.
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