Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The core of assignment games is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first list consists of Pareto optimality, consistency, pairwise monotonicity, and individual monotonicity. The second list is obtained from the first one replacing the last axiom by population monotonicity. As a corollary, individual monotonicity and population monotonicity are equivalent under the other axioms. The core is also characterized by the second list on the restricted domain in which the worth of each pair is non-negative and every reservation value is zero.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)248-261
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume53
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Nov

Fingerprint

Axiomatization
Monotonicity
Assignment game
Axioms
Population monotonicity
Axiom
Pareto optimality
Reservation
Restricted domain

Keywords

  • Assignment games
  • Consistency
  • Core
  • Population monotonicity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Axiomatization of the core of assignment games. / Toda, Manabu.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 53, No. 2, 11.2005, p. 248-261.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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