Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games

René Van Den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    37 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)303-340
    Number of pages38
    JournalTheory and Decision
    Volume67
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009 Sep

    Fingerprint

    axiomatization
    Values
    Specifications
    Axiomatization
    Surplus sharing
    TU game
    Surplus
    Players

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Decision Sciences(all)
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Applied Psychology
    • Social Sciences(all)

    Cite this

    Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games. / Van Den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko.

    In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 67, No. 3, 09.2009, p. 303-340.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    @article{1ae9a33dba1b490f87da891e51317454,
    title = "Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games",
    abstract = "A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.",
    author = "{Van Den Brink}, Ren{\'e} and Yukihiko Funaki",
    year = "2009",
    month = "9",
    doi = "10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x",
    language = "English",
    volume = "67",
    pages = "303--340",
    journal = "Theory and Decision",
    issn = "0040-5833",
    publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
    number = "3",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games

    AU - Van Den Brink, René

    AU - Funaki, Yukihiko

    PY - 2009/9

    Y1 - 2009/9

    N2 - A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

    AB - A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=69949105495&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=69949105495&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x

    DO - 10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x

    M3 - Article

    VL - 67

    SP - 303

    EP - 340

    JO - Theory and Decision

    JF - Theory and Decision

    SN - 0040-5833

    IS - 3

    ER -