Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions

Takaaki Abe

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.12.001

Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions

Takaaki Abe

School of Political Science and Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We axiomatize Hart and Kurz's (1983) two coalition aggregation functions known as the γ-function and the δ-function. A coalition aggregation function is a mapping that assigns a partition to each profile of coalitions selected by players. Through our axiomatization results, we observe that neither the γ-function nor the δ-function satisfies monotonicity. We propose a monotonic function and axiomatically characterize it.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	69-75
Number of pages	7
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	103
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.12.001
Publication status	Published - 2020 Jan

Keywords

Axiomatization
Coalition formation
Coalition structure
Monotonicity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Social Sciences(all)
Psychology(all)
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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Abe, T. (2020). Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions. Mathematical social sciences, 103, 69-75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.12.001

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