Behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors

Fund management and corporate governance

Megumi Suto, Masashi Toshino

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    19 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This study examines the behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors and discusses implications for their role in corporate governance, based on the findings of a questionnaire survey of fund managers carried out in 2003. Statistical analysis of the survey results reveals a short-term bias in fund managers' investment time horizons, herding and self-marketing to improve the appearance of portfolio performance under the pressure either of customers or of institutional restraints. We conclude that institutional investors' behaviour contradicts their role as shareholders.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)466-477
    Number of pages12
    JournalCorporate Governance
    Volume13
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2005 Jul

    Fingerprint

    Managers
    Shareholders
    Marketing
    Statistical methods
    Fund managers
    Fund management
    Corporate governance
    Behavioral biases
    Institutional investors
    Questionnaire survey
    Investor behavior
    Statistical analysis
    Portfolio performance
    Time horizon
    Herding

    Keywords

    • Corporate governance
    • Fund management
    • Herding
    • Institutional investors
    • Investment time horizon
    • Self-marketing

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Management of Technology and Innovation
    • Strategy and Management
    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

    Cite this

    Behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors : Fund management and corporate governance. / Suto, Megumi; Toshino, Masashi.

    In: Corporate Governance, Vol. 13, No. 4, 07.2005, p. 466-477.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Suto, Megumi ; Toshino, Masashi. / Behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors : Fund management and corporate governance. In: Corporate Governance. 2005 ; Vol. 13, No. 4. pp. 466-477.
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