Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

Kohei Kawamura, Inés Moreno de Barreda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more likely to have high ability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)240-243
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume123
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 May
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Contest
  • Favouritism
  • Head start
  • Selection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents. / Kawamura, Kohei; Moreno de Barreda, Inés.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 123, No. 2, 05.2014, p. 240-243.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kawamura, Kohei ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés. / Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents. In: Economics Letters. 2014 ; Vol. 123, No. 2. pp. 240-243.
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