Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

Kohei Kawamura, Inés Moreno de Barreda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more likely to have high ability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)240-243
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume123
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 May 1

Keywords

  • Contest
  • Favouritism
  • Head start
  • Selection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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