Abstract
Our model shows that it is optimal for shareholders to choose boards of directors whose preferences do not align with those of the shareholders. Such a board composition works as the shareholders' commitment to providing an incentive for risk-averse CEOs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 846-852 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Economics Bulletin |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 Apr 22 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Cite this
Board independence and a shareholder's commitment. / Orihara, Masanori.
In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 2, 22.04.2017, p. 846-852.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Board independence and a shareholder's commitment
AU - Orihara, Masanori
PY - 2017/4/22
Y1 - 2017/4/22
N2 - Our model shows that it is optimal for shareholders to choose boards of directors whose preferences do not align with those of the shareholders. Such a board composition works as the shareholders' commitment to providing an incentive for risk-averse CEOs.
AB - Our model shows that it is optimal for shareholders to choose boards of directors whose preferences do not align with those of the shareholders. Such a board composition works as the shareholders' commitment to providing an incentive for risk-averse CEOs.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85018429770&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
VL - 37
SP - 846
EP - 852
JO - Economics Bulletin
JF - Economics Bulletin
SN - 1545-2921
IS - 2
ER -