Board independence and a shareholder's commitment

Masanori Orihara

Board independence and a shareholder's commitment

Masanori Orihara

School of Commerce

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Our model shows that it is optimal for shareholders to choose boards of directors whose preferences do not align with those of the shareholders. Such a board composition works as the shareholders' commitment to providing an incentive for risk-averse CEOs.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	846-852
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	37
Issue number	2
Publication status	Published - 2017 Apr 22

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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Board independence and a shareholder's commitment

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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