Board independence and a shareholder's commitment

Masanori Orihara*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


Our model shows that it is optimal for shareholders to choose boards of directors whose preferences do not align with those of the shareholders. Such a board composition works as the shareholders' commitment to providing an incentive for risk-averse CEOs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)846-852
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Apr 22

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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