Board independence and a shareholder's commitment

Masanori Orihara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Our model shows that it is optimal for shareholders to choose boards of directors whose preferences do not align with those of the shareholders. Such a board composition works as the shareholders' commitment to providing an incentive for risk-averse CEOs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)846-852
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume37
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Apr 22

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Board independence
Shareholders
Board composition
Board of directors
Chief executive officer
Incentives
Risk-averse

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Board independence and a shareholder's commitment. / Orihara, Masanori.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 2, 22.04.2017, p. 846-852.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Orihara, M 2017, 'Board independence and a shareholder's commitment', Economics Bulletin, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 846-852.
Orihara, Masanori. / Board independence and a shareholder's commitment. In: Economics Bulletin. 2017 ; Vol. 37, No. 2. pp. 846-852.
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