Can firms with political connections borrow more than those without? Evidence from firm-level data for Indonesia

Jiangtao Fu, Daichi Shimamoto, Yasuyuki Todo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Using a unique firm-level dataset for the manufacturing sector in Indonesia, we examine how firms’ political connections affect their access to finance and performance. We determine individual firm's political connections by identifying whether the government owns shares in the firm, whether politicians are on its board of directors, and whether highly-ranked managers personally know any politician. Although several studies have examined effects of political connections on firms financing and performance, we contribute to the literature by distinguishing between large firms and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), between the loan approval and amount setting processes, and between formal and informal political connections. We find that politically connected firms are more likely to be able to borrow from state-owned banks. Moreover, being connected to the government raises the probability that a firm can receive the full loan amount it applied for. The improvement in access to finance from political connections is more prominent for SMEs than for large firms. Furthermore, such improvement mostly comes from personal connections with politicians rather than more formal connections measured by the government ownership or politicians on the board of directors. Finally, we examine the effect of political connected lending on allocative efficiency of capital and find weak evidence that scarce financial resources are likely channeled by state-owned banks to politically connected but less productive firms.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)45-55
    Number of pages11
    JournalJournal of Asian Economics
    Volume52
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 Oct 1

    Fingerprint

    Political connections
    Firm-level data
    Indonesia
    Politicians
    Access to finance
    Government
    Loans
    Board of directors
    Large firms
    State-owned banks
    Small and medium-sized enterprises
    Financing
    Manufacturing sector
    Government ownership
    Lending
    Allocative efficiency
    Managers
    Financial resources

    Keywords

    • Credit constraints
    • Indonesia
    • Political connections
    • Small and medium enterprises

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Can firms with political connections borrow more than those without? Evidence from firm-level data for Indonesia. / Fu, Jiangtao; Shimamoto, Daichi; Todo, Yasuyuki.

    In: Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 52, 01.10.2017, p. 45-55.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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