Can partisan voting lead to truth?

Naoki Masuda*, S. Redner

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)


We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as 'truth' or 'falsehood'. Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be persuaded to adopt a false opinion (and thus be discordant with its innate preference) or the agent can possess an internally concordant 'true' opinion. Parallel states exist for agents that inherently prefer falsehood. We determine the conditions under which a population of such agents can ultimately reach a consensus for the truth, reach a consensus for falsehood, or reach an impasse where an agent tends to adopt the opinion that is in internal concordance with its innate preference with the outcome that consensus is never achieved.

Original languageEnglish
Article numberL02002
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Feb
Externally publishedYes


  • interacting agent models

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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