Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing

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94 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal-multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting. It is shown that the principal can implement given efforts, via non-individualistic incentive contracts, at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other’s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently. Permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result, for there is no coalition-proof revelation mechanism improving the principal’s welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D82.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)410-427
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume60
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1993
Externally publishedYes

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Risk sharing
Incentives
Incentive contracts
Contracting
Communication
Economics
Moral hazard
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing. / Itoh, Hideshi.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1993, p. 410-427.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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