Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions

T. S H Driessen, Yukihiko Funaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

61 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The first part is the study of several conditions which are sufficient for the coincidence of the prenucleolus concept and the egalitarian nonseparable contribution (ENSC-) method. The main sufficient condition for the coincidence involved requires that the maximal excesses at the ENSC-solution are determined by the (n-1)-person coalitions in the n-person game. The second part is the study of both a new type of games, the so-called k-coalitional n-person games, and the interrelationship between solutions on the class of those games. The main results state that the Shapley value of a k-coalitional n-person game can be written as a convex or affine combination of the ENSC-solution and the centre of the imputation set.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-30
Number of pages16
JournalOR Spektrum
Volume13
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1991 Mar
Externally publishedYes

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Collinearity
Imputation
Interrelationship
Shapley value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions. / Driessen, T. S H; Funaki, Yukihiko.

In: OR Spektrum, Vol. 13, No. 1, 03.1991, p. 15-30.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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