This paper presents an alternative solution, called "face-to-face" competition, to the hold-up problem of relation-specific investments in the world of incomplete contracts. By inherent multiplicity of equilibria and incentive-compatible equilibrium selection, a tournament among multiple agents is endogenously created in the structure of face-to-face competition to strengthen their investment incentive. This approach also explains, by the reason other than bargaining power and insurance, why typical auto-assemblers in Japan do not vertically integrate a single parts supplier but transact with two potentially competitive suppliers in their developments of new models. J. Japan. Int. Econ., September 1996, 10(3), pp. 199-232. Faculty of Economics, Seikei University; Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo; and Faculty of Economics, Hosei University.
|Number of pages||34|
|Journal||Journal of The Japanese and International Economies|
|Publication status||Published - 1996 Sep|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations