Abstract
This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 373-397 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1995 Dec |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems. / Sasaki, Hiroo.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 24, No. 4, 12.1995, p. 373-397.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
AU - Sasaki, Hiroo
PY - 1995/12
Y1 - 1995/12
N2 - This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.
AB - This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=21844517145&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=21844517145&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/BF01243039
DO - 10.1007/BF01243039
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:21844517145
VL - 24
SP - 373
EP - 397
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
SN - 0020-7276
IS - 4
ER -