Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)373-397
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume24
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1995 Dec

Fingerprint

Assignment Problem
Monotonicity
axiomatization
Competitive Equilibrium
Indivisible
economy
Characterization Theorem
Axiomatization
Resource Allocation
Axioms
Pairwise
Theorem
resources
Assignment problem
Axiomatic characterization
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems. / Sasaki, Hiroo.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 24, No. 4, 12.1995, p. 373-397.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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