Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari, Yukihiko Funaki, Peter Sudhölter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.

Original languageEnglish
JournalReview of Economic Design
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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