Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games

René van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, Boram Park

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution (which allocates the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all players equally over all players) and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (which first assigns every player its singleton worth and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition, N, equally over all players). The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value (which first assigns every player its contribution to the ‘grand coalition’ and then allocates the remainder equally over all players). We provide characterizations of the two classes of solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)427-447
Number of pages21
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume81
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Sep 1

Keywords

  • CIS-value
  • Consistency
  • ENSC-value
  • Equal division solution
  • Population solidarity
  • TU-game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

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