Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games

René van Den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, Boram Park

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution (which allocates the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all players equally over all players) and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (which first assigns every player its singleton worth and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition, N, equally over all players). The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value (which first assigns every player its contribution to the ‘grand coalition’ and then allocates the remainder equally over all players). We provide characterizations of the two classes of solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-21
    Number of pages21
    JournalTheory and Decision
    DOIs
    Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2016 Mar 1

    Fingerprint

    Grand Coalition
    solidarity
    Population
    Values
    Gravitation
    Egalitarian solution
    Solidarity
    TU game
    Players

    Keywords

    • CIS-value
    • Consistency
    • ENSC-value
    • Equal division solution
    • Population solidarity
    • TU-game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Decision Sciences(all)
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Applied Psychology
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
    • Developmental and Educational Psychology

    Cite this

    Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games. / van Den Brink, René; Chun, Youngsub; Funaki, Yukihiko; Park, Boram.

    In: Theory and Decision, 01.03.2016, p. 1-21.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    van Den Brink, René ; Chun, Youngsub ; Funaki, Yukihiko ; Park, Boram. / Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games. In: Theory and Decision. 2016 ; pp. 1-21.
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