Abstract
Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 738-748 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 136 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 Sep |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- Blotto game
- Budget restrictions
- Contests
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Contests with limited resources. / Kvasov, Dmitriy.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 136, No. 1, 09.2007, p. 738-748.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Contests with limited resources
AU - Kvasov, Dmitriy
PY - 2007/9
Y1 - 2007/9
N2 - Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.
AB - Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.
KW - All-pay auctions
KW - Blotto game
KW - Budget restrictions
KW - Contests
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34548049750&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34548049750&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.007
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34548049750
VL - 136
SP - 738
EP - 748
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -