Contests with limited resources

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

50 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)738-748
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume136
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Sep
Externally publishedYes

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Contests
Resources
Electoral competition
Lobbying
Mixed strategy equilibrium

Keywords

  • All-pay auctions
  • Blotto game
  • Budget restrictions
  • Contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Contests with limited resources. / Kvasov, Dmitriy.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 136, No. 1, 09.2007, p. 738-748.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kvasov, Dmitriy. / Contests with limited resources. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 ; Vol. 136, No. 1. pp. 738-748.
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