Contests with limited resources

Dmitriy Kvasov

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.007

Contests with limited resources

Dmitriy Kvasov^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

64 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	738-748
Number of pages	11
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	136
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.007
Publication status	Published - 2007 Sep
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Blotto game
Budget restrictions
Contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.007

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title = "Contests with limited resources",

abstract = "Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.",

keywords = "All-pay auctions, Blotto game, Budget restrictions, Contests",

author = "Dmitriy Kvasov",

note = "Funding Information: I am grateful to Kalyan Chatterjee and Vijay Krishna for their guidance and advice. I also benefited from discussions with Tomas Sj{\"o}str{\"o}m, John Morgan, and Nicola Persico. I thank the editor and three anonymous referees for valuable comments. The financial support from a grant to Penn State by the Henry Luce Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.",

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AB - Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.

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KW - Budget restrictions

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Contests with limited resources

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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