Corporate governance, relational banking and R & D

Evidence from Japanese large firms in the 1980s and 1990s

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the effects of the Japanese corporate governance structure on corporate investments, especially R & D, dividing Japanese high R & D firms into two groups, i.e. young growing firms and old mature firms. The main bank relationship mitigates the asymmetric information problem for young growing firms' R & D expenditure in the 1990s. Portfolio investors strengthen the cash constraints on R & D, while stable shareholders offset the myopic pressure by portfolio investors. We also show some evidence that stable shareholders induced old mature firms to overinvest during the bubble economy period.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)769-787
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Journal of Technology Management
Volume23
Issue number7-8
Publication statusPublished - 2002

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Shareholders
corporate governance
banking
firm
shareholder
evidence
investor
bank
expenditures
Corporate governance
Banking
Large firms
economy
Group

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Free cash flow
  • J-type corporate governance structure
  • Managerial myopia
  • R & D

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Engineering (miscellaneous)

Cite this

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AU - Kato, Atsushi

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AB - We investigate the effects of the Japanese corporate governance structure on corporate investments, especially R & D, dividing Japanese high R & D firms into two groups, i.e. young growing firms and old mature firms. The main bank relationship mitigates the asymmetric information problem for young growing firms' R & D expenditure in the 1990s. Portfolio investors strengthen the cash constraints on R & D, while stable shareholders offset the myopic pressure by portfolio investors. We also show some evidence that stable shareholders induced old mature firms to overinvest during the bubble economy period.

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