Corporate misconduct in Japan: a conflict of corporate governance logics

Hidetaka Aoki, S. U. Weichieh, Junichi Yamanoi, Eric W.K. Tsang

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

We discuss why corporate misconduct is increasing in Japan through a lenses of comparative corporate governance. We find that managerial ownership under stakeholder logic decreases whereas foreign ownership under shareholder logic increases corporate misconduct. Although stock options bring in strong shareholder logic, it has different effects on above mentioned relationships.

Original languageEnglish
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jan 1
Event77th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2017 - Atlanta, United States
Duration: 2017 Aug 42017 Aug 8

Other

Other77th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2017
CountryUnited States
CityAtlanta
Period17/8/417/8/8

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Industrial relations
  • Management Information Systems

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  • Cite this

    Aoki, H., Weichieh, S. U., Yamanoi, J., & Tsang, E. W. K. (2017). Corporate misconduct in Japan: a conflict of corporate governance logics. Paper presented at 77th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2017, Atlanta, United States. https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2017.125