Correction to: Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies (Public Choice, (2021), 187, 3-4, (501-518), 10.1007/s11127-020-00792-8)

Kana Inata*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debatepeer-review

Abstract

My article (Inata, 2021) derives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a simple game to analyze power-sharing negotiation and commitment problems between an absolute monarch and the regime’s elites. This equilibrium is, however, not unique, strictly speaking; while it is effectively unique in a behavioral sense because it generates the unique outcomes, it does not rule out all best-reply strategies. The article’s conclusion about the role played by the public nevertheless remains intact. For interested readers, I will detail those equilibria in this correction.

Original languageEnglish
JournalPublic Choice
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2021
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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