Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment

Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér, Róbert F. Veszteg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)212-239
Number of pages28
JournalExperimental Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Mar 1


  • Decentralized markets
  • Efficiency
  • Laboratory experiments
  • Stability
  • Two-sided matching

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)


Dive into the research topics of 'Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this