Decomposing a balanced game: A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core

Takaaki Abe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The Bondareva–Shapley condition is the most eminent necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a transferable utility game to be nonempty. In this paper, we provide a new necessary and sufficient condition. We show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game can be decomposed into some simple games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)9-13
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume176
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Mar 1

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Balanced games
Transferable utility games
Simple game

Keywords

  • Cooperative game
  • Core
  • Decomposition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Decomposing a balanced game : A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core. / Abe, Takaaki.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 176, 01.03.2019, p. 9-13.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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