Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games

Shuige Liu

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2018.02.002

Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

This paper considers the directed graphical structure of a game, called influence structure, where a directed edge from player i to player j indicates that player i may be able to affect j's payoff via his unilateral change of strategies. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of games having a directed graph in terms of the structure of that graph. We also discuss the relationship between the structure of graphs and potential games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	273-277
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	46
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.02.002
Publication status	Published - 2018 May 1

Keywords

Directed graphical games
Potential games
Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2018.02.002

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Liu, S. (2018). Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games. Operations Research Letters, 46(3), 273-277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.02.002

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