Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper considers the directed graphical structure of a game, called influence structure, where a directed edge from player i to player j indicates that player i may be able to affect j's payoff via his unilateral change of strategies. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of games having a directed graph in terms of the structure of that graph. We also discuss the relationship between the structure of graphs and potential games.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)273-277
    Number of pages5
    JournalOperations Research Letters
    Volume46
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018 May 1

    Fingerprint

    Potential Games
    Directed graphs
    Nash Equilibrium
    Game
    Graph in graph theory
    Directed Graph
    Necessary Conditions
    Graphics
    Potential games
    Nash equilibrium
    Sufficient Conditions
    Strategy
    Graph

    Keywords

    • Directed graphical games
    • Potential games
    • Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Software
    • Management Science and Operations Research
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Applied Mathematics

    Cite this

    Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games. / Liu, Shuige.

    In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 46, No. 3, 01.05.2018, p. 273-277.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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