Directional equilibria

Hun Chung, John Duggan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


We propose the solution concept of directional equilibrium for the multidimensional model of voting with general spatial preferences. This concept isolates alternatives that are stable with respect to forces applied by all voters in the directions of their gradients, and it extends a known concept from statistics for Euclidean preferences. We establish connections to the majority core, Pareto optimality, and existence and closed graph, and we provide non-cooperative foundations in terms of a local contest game played by voters.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)272-305
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jul 1


  • Equilibrium
  • geometric median
  • majority core
  • mediancentre
  • spatial median
  • spatial model
  • structure-induced equilibrium
  • utilitarianism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science


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