Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility

Mamoru Kaneko, Aniruddha Mitra

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of discrimination and prejudices from the perspective of inductive game theory. We extend the festival game, originally given by Kaneko-Matsui, to include new constraints on the observability of ethnic identities and on accessible locations for players. We characterize the Nash equilibrium set, which reveals a different variety of segregation patterns and discriminatory behavior. In order to facilitate the analysis of discrimination and prejudices, we introduce a measure of discrimination, which chooses a representative equilibrium with the smallest degree of discrimination. Using this measure, we discuss various new phenomena, such as discrimination in an ethnic hierarchy; similar ethnicities as discriminated and as discriminating; and mutual discrimination. The introduction of limited observability and accessibility enables us to obtain those results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)34-45
Number of pages12
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume62
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Jul
Externally publishedYes

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Holidays
festival
Observability
Accessibility
Discrimination
discrimination
Game Theory
Game
prejudice
game theory
Segregation
ethnic identity
Nash Equilibrium
segregation
ethnicity
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility. / Kaneko, Mamoru; Mitra, Aniruddha.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 62, No. 1, 07.2011, p. 34-45.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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