Domestic politics, reputational sanctions, and international compliance

Jong Hee Park, Kentaro Hirose

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The argument that reputational concerns promote compliance is at the center of the literature of international cooperation. In this paper, we study how reputational sanctions affect compliance when domestic parties carry their own reputations in international negotiations. We showed that the prospect of international cooperation varies a lot depending on who sits at the negotiation table, how partisan preferences for compliance are different, and how much international audiences discriminate between different types of noncompliance. We illustrate implications of our model using episodes from the negotiations between the United States and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)300-320
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Theory
Volume5
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • commitment problem
  • compliance
  • North Korea
  • nuclear weapons
  • reputational sanctions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Law

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