Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets

Xianwei Li, Bo Gu, Cheng Zhang, Zhi Liu, Kyoko Yamori, Yoshiaki Tanaka

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Abstract

    In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) with spectrum holder, two secondary operators and secondary users (SUs). In the system model under consideration, the spectrum allocated to the two secondary operators can be shared by SUs, which means that secondary operators buy spectrum from spectrum holder and then sell spectrum access service to SUs. We model the relationship between secondary operators and SUs as a two-stage stackelberg game, where secondary operators make spectrum channel quality and price decisions in the first stage, and then the SUs make their spectrum demands decisions. The backward induction method is employed to solve the stackelberg game. Numerical results are performed to evaluate our analysis.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Pages1-5
    Number of pages5
    Volume2018-January
    ISBN (Electronic)9783901882982
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 12
    Event13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 - Tokyo, Japan
    Duration: 2017 Nov 262017 Nov 30

    Other

    Other13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017
    CountryJapan
    CityTokyo
    Period17/11/2617/11/30

    Fingerprint

    Cognitive radio
    Stackelberg Game
    Operator
    Backward Induction
    Spectrum Sharing
    Cognitive Radio Networks
    User Model
    Market
    Duopoly
    Price competition
    Numerical Results
    Evaluate
    Stackelberg game
    Model

    Keywords

    • CRN
    • Pricing
    • secondary operators
    • SUs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Information Systems and Management
    • Control and Optimization

    Cite this

    Li, X., Gu, B., Zhang, C., Liu, Z., Yamori, K., & Tanaka, Y. (2018). Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets. In 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 (Vol. 2018-January, pp. 1-5). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/CNSM.2017.8256057

    Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets. / Li, Xianwei; Gu, Bo; Zhang, Cheng; Liu, Zhi; Yamori, Kyoko; Tanaka, Yoshiaki.

    2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 1-5.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    Li, X, Gu, B, Zhang, C, Liu, Z, Yamori, K & Tanaka, Y 2018, Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets. in 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. vol. 2018-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1-5, 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017, Tokyo, Japan, 17/11/26. https://doi.org/10.23919/CNSM.2017.8256057
    Li X, Gu B, Zhang C, Liu Z, Yamori K, Tanaka Y. Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets. In 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. Vol. 2018-January. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 1-5 https://doi.org/10.23919/CNSM.2017.8256057
    Li, Xianwei ; Gu, Bo ; Zhang, Cheng ; Liu, Zhi ; Yamori, Kyoko ; Tanaka, Yoshiaki. / Duopoly price competition in secondary spectrum markets. 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017. Vol. 2018-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 1-5
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