Abstract
While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 214-222 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 Mar 20 |
Keywords
- Competitive allocation
- Dynamics
- Foresight
- Indivisible goods market
- Stable set
- Strict core
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics
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Cite this
Kamijo, Y., & Kawasaki, R. (2010). Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46(2), 214-222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.005