Dynastic politicians

Theory and evidence from Japan

Yasushi Asako, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    20 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)5-32
    Number of pages28
    JournalJapanese Journal of Political Science
    Volume16
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Feb 10

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    politician
    Japan
    district
    evidence
    family member
    performance
    economics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Dynastic politicians : Theory and evidence from Japan. / Asako, Yasushi; Iida, Takeshi; Matsubayashi, Tetsuya; Ueda, Michiko.

    In: Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 1, 10.02.2015, p. 5-32.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Asako, Yasushi ; Iida, Takeshi ; Matsubayashi, Tetsuya ; Ueda, Michiko. / Dynastic politicians : Theory and evidence from Japan. In: Japanese Journal of Political Science. 2015 ; Vol. 16, No. 1. pp. 5-32.
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