Effect of direct reciprocity and network structure on continuing prosperity of social networking services

Kengo Osaka, Fujio Toriumi, Toshiharu Sugawara

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Background: Social networking services (SNSs) are widely used as communicative tools for a variety of purposes. SNSs rely on the users’ individual activities associated with some cost and effort, and thus it is not known why users voluntarily continue to participate in SNSs. Because the structures of SNSs are similar to that of the public goods (PG) game, some studies have focused on why voluntary activities emerge as an optimal strategy by modifying the PG game. However, their models do not include direct reciprocity between users, even though reciprocity is a key mechanism that evolves and sustains cooperation in human society. Proposed methods: We developed an abstract SNS model called the reciprocity rewards and meta-rewards games that include direct reciprocity by extending the existing models. Then, we investigated how direct reciprocity in an SNS facilitates cooperation that corresponds to participation in SNS by posting articles and comments and how the structure of the networks of users exerts an influence on the strategies of users using the reciprocity rewards game. Experimental results: We run reciprocity rewards games on various complex networks and an instance network of Facebook and found that two types of stable cooperation emerged. First, reciprocity slightly improves the rate of cooperation in complete graphs but the improvement is insignificant because of the instability of cooperation. However, this instability can be avoided by making two assumptions: high degree of fun, i.e. articles are read with high probability, and different attitudes to reciprocal and non-reciprocal agents. We then propose the concept of half free riders to explain what strategy sustains cooperation-dominant situations. Second, we indicate that a certain WS network structure affects users’ optimal strategy and facilitates stable cooperation without any extra assumptions. We give a detailed analysis of the different characteristics of the two types of cooperation-dominant situations and the effect of the memory of reciprocal agents on cooperation.

    Original languageEnglish
    Article number2
    JournalComputational Social Networks
    Volume4
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017 Dec 1

    Fingerprint

    Social Networking
    Reciprocity
    Network Structure
    Reward
    Game
    Complex networks
    Optimal Strategy
    Data storage equipment
    Costs
    Complete Graph
    Complex Networks
    Continue
    Model
    Experimental Results

    Keywords

    • Complex networks
    • Evolutionary game
    • Meta-norms game
    • Reciprocity
    • Social networking services

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Information Systems
    • Computer Science Applications
    • Human-Computer Interaction
    • Modelling and Simulation

    Cite this

    Effect of direct reciprocity and network structure on continuing prosperity of social networking services. / Osaka, Kengo; Toriumi, Fujio; Sugawara, Toshiharu.

    In: Computational Social Networks, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2, 01.12.2017.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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