Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market

[No Value] Geerli; S. Niioka; R. Yokoyama

doi:10.1016/S0142-0615(02)00012-1

Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market

[No Value] Geerli, S. Niioka, R. Yokoyama

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	491-498
Number of pages	8
Journal	International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy System
Volume	25
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0142-0615(02)00012-1
Publication status	Published - 2003 Jul

Keywords

Deregulation
Economical load distribution
Electricity price

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1016/S0142-0615(02)00012-1

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title = "Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market",

abstract = "A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.",

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AU - Niioka, S.

AU - Yokoyama, R.

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AB - A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness.

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KW - Economical load distribution

KW - Electricity price

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Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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